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ESSAY
PROTECTIVE ORDERS, PLAINTIFFS, DEFENDANTS AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN DISCLOSURE; WHERE DOES
THE BALANCE LIE?
Alan B. Morrison*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a basic principle of the American system of jurisprudence
that the courts of the United States are open. That includes not
only the opportunity for the public to attend courtroom proceed-
ings, but also the right to examine the documents that are filed in
court. However, this principle of openness can sometimes come
into conflict with other principles in our justice system. Everyone
recognizes that there are some situations in which information
should not be made public, at least not immediately. The problem
is how to identify and limit those situations in which information
is not made public so that we do not have too much information
kept secret. The problem is complicated because a litigant's trial
strategy may not be consistent with the public's interest in greater
disclosure. Perhaps the easiest way to describe the problem is to
work through a law school hypothetical.
II. INTERESTS AFFECTED
A. The Interests of Litigants
Suppose that in 1978 a young unmarried woman, age eighteen,
began taking a new birth control pill approved by the federal Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") as being safe and effective. Un-
* B.A., 1959, Yale University; LL.B., 1966, Harvard Law School; Director, Public Citizen
Litigation Group, Washington, D.C. This essay is adapted from remarks Mr. Morrison made
at the fifth annual Emroch Lecture at the University of Richmond in April 1989.
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fortunately, at age twenty-six, this woman developed cancer of the
uterus, had to have a hysterectomy, and was no longer able to have
children. She had been married for two years at that time, and
after she recovered from the operation, she learned that there was
significant evidence of danger from the pill and that it may have
been the cause of her cancer. After much consideration, she de-
cides to bring a lawsuit against the manufacturer and files the case
in federal court. In her complaint, she seeks both actual damages
and punitive damages because she has reason to believe that the
company in fact knew about the dangers and did not disclose them
in order to keep its profits up.
After she files her complaint, her lawyer serves on the defendant
a set of interrogatories and a request for the production of docu-
ments seeking, in particular, the results of all tests that were done
on animals and on human beings, all the adverse drug reaction re-
ports, internal investigations, complaints and everything else which
was supposed to have been submitted to the FDA. The defendant,
of course, would prefer not to give the plaintiff anything, but it
realizes that there is no real chance of success in taking that posi-
tion. After all, the plaintiff has a genuine need for the material,
which is obviously relevant to her charges, and her suit could not
go forward without it.
The defendant is concerned, however, that much of the informa-
tion sought is what the defendant refers to as "trade secrets" or
"proprietary information." The defendant does not want to have
this information disclosed to the public, but again there is no real
chance that the information is going to be kept entirely private
throughout the litigation, particularly if there is a trial. The de-
fendant's best hope is to keep the data secret for the time being,
and to do this the magic words are "protective order."
Before one castigates the defendant's side too thoroughly, we
should ask whether the defendant has any legitimate interest in
keeping this information secret. At this point, we do not know
what kind of information the defense actually has, let alone what it
shows. The harm from disclosure may depend upon the patent sta-
tus of the drug because some of the information may already have
been made public. The legitimacy of the secrecy claim may also
depend on whether the information shows how the drug might be
manufactured or whether it contains data about sales or other bus-
iness information. There may also be attorney-client information
as a result of the investigation by its lawyers or other people for
[Vol. 24:109
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the company. Whether the information qualifies as a trade secret
or proprietary information, it seems clear that this is not the kind
of information that any company would ordinarily make available
to anyone on the outside. At the very least, I would concede that
we cannot be sure that all of the information is not possibly within
the category that may be protected by the trade secret rule.'
If the defendant has its way, the plaintiff will have to obtain all
this information under a protective order, under which the plain-
tiff (or, more precisely, the plaintiff's attorney) promises not to di-
vulge the information to anyone without permission of the defend-
ant or the court. The defendant is particularly concerned about
certain groups of people gaining access to this information. For in-
stance, information may come out that may be highly prejudicial
to the defendant, and the defendant has a legitimate interest in
seeing that jurors do not consider such information, especially if it
is not admissible at trial. The defendant also has an interest in
seeing that competitors do not obtain such information, particu-
larly if internal records suggest the product may not be what the
business has represented to the public. The defendant is also inter-
ested in seeing that the FDA and relevant congressional commit-
tees do not get too involved and the defendant is surely interested
in keeping its name out of the press over the misleading results of
the drug. Last and probably not least, the defendant is very inter-
ested in seeing that attorneys for other potential plaintiffs do not
obtain the information and get ideas about bringing their own law-
suits against the company. Some of these concerns may be legiti-
mate, and the problem is that once the information is in the public
domain, it is there for everybody. What can the defendant legiti-
mately ask the plaintiff to do in these circumstances?
The defendant will probably seek a protective order, which pro-
hibits the dissemination of this kind of information, except to a
few narrow categories of people. These categories might include
other lawyers in the plaintiff's attorney's office, the plaintiff her-
self, expert witnesses, and perhaps a few others provided they sign
a confidentiality agreement under which they would not divulge
any of the information without permission from the court or the
defendant.
The plaintiff will want to use this information in discovery, by
asking questions based upon it in depositions or in further inter-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26ic)(7).
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rogatories, and to submit it to the court if the defendant tries to
have the case dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. The
plaintiff also wants to be able, at some point, to ask the court to
make the information public so the plaintiff can conduct the trial
in the way that her lawyers believe is best for her.
What exactly is it that the defendant wants to keep secret? Ob-
viously, the defendant would like nothing to be public. For the de-
fendant, nothing is going to improve if more information is made
public. Among other things, the defendant believes that everything
about its business is proprietary; it is all trade secrets, and none of
this should be made public. The natural reaction of corporations is
to close everything up and keep it that way.
However, the question is whether the parties and the court
should go through these records and try to separate that which is
truly confidential from that which is not confidential. If the answer
is "yes," the defendant is going to say something such as: "If we
have to go through item by item, document by document, it's going
to take a lot more time, and you, the plaintiff, are not going to get
this case close to trial any time soon." That result would impose an
enormous financial burden on the plaintiff and cause an enormous
delay as well. Thus, the plaintiff has to weigh whether it is worth-
while to fight the defendant over the protective order, under which
the defendant basically says that anything said is confidential, at
least for the time being. The plaintiff must consider the burden of
keeping this information confidential, how to get the information
and use it in court, and possible mistakes if documents are not
filed under seal as required.
Another matter for plaintiff and her lawyer to consider is that
the defendant is almost certain to demand the return of all infor-
mation when the case is over. "After all," defense counsel will say,
"you've either won, or you've lost, and anything that is not public
in the courtroom, you ought to have to turn back over to me. You
don't need it any more, and if you need it, you can just come and
ask me for it. If you ever have another lawsuit, I'll be glad to give
it to you."
Such a proposal puts the plaintiff's attorney in another difficult
position. It is true that, when the case is over, the lawyer will not
need that information for that case. On the other hand, given the
breadth of this protective order, the files of the plaintiff's lawyer
must be decimated if everything that refers to 'confidential infor-
[Vol. 24:109
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mation (and that is the way these protective orders are always
written), as well as the confidential documents themselves, must be
returned to the defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff's lawyer must
find a way to keep the files intact. As I will mention a bit later,
there are other similar problems that need to be addressed.
At this point, the defendant may say: "Take it or leave it. If you
don't like the protective order that was drafted, then we'll go to
the judge and see what happens." Is that a proper or improper
position? In fact, the plaintiff's lawyer does not have much choice.
The defendant has an arguable trade secret claim, and judges
worry that once the information gets out, one can never put the
genie back in the bottle. Moreover, most judges are busy and do
not want to have lawyers fight in front of them on a document-by-
document basis, particularly when there are thousands of pieces of
paper at issue. The judge is likely to tell the plaintiff's attorney to
sign the protective order, proceed with the litigation, and worry
about the problems later. In that regard, the plaintiff's lawyer
needs to think about his obligation to his client. The client's prin-
cipal interest is in getting money as soon as possible. Most clients
are not interested in helping the FDA or other lawyers. For these
reasons, the plaintiff's lawyer will almost certainly consent to an
order like this, as long as there is a little flexibility, and he and his
client are not locked into secrecy forever. If the plaintiff fails to
consent, most judges will sign the order anyway, and the plaintiff's
lawyer will have just made the judge unnecessarily angry (unlike
the times when it is clearly necessary to incur a judge's wrath).
B. The Interests of Other Groups
1. The Press
The plaintiff is now reasonably happy, the defendant is happy,
the trial judge is happy, and that ought to take care of everybody.
Or does it? Are there some people that have a legitimate interest
in disclosure who are not taken into account under this scheme? Is
the press taken into account? The press will believe there is a won-
derful story and that they have a first amendment right to report
the news. Unfortunately for the press, the Supreme Court of the
United States said in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart2 that there is
2. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
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no first amendment right to disseminate information under a pro-
tective order at the pre-trial stage.
2. Regulatory Agencies
Another interest is that of the FDA and other regulatory bodies
responsible for determining whether this pill should be taken off
the market if it is still being sold, or whether there should be a
recall or notification if it is no longer on the market. Why doesn't
the FDA simply ask the company itself for these documents? It
has the power to ask and probably the ability to subpoena the doc-
uments if the request is not honored.
But government agencies are not always on top of the situation.
They may know generally about the problems with the pill, but
they may not know about this lawsuit. They may not know what
records the plaintiff has obtained, and if they ask the company for
what the plaintiff has received, the company may give the agency
what it gave yesterday, but not today, tomorrow, or the next day.
In addition, the FDA has a lot of projects under way, and the pill
may not be at the top of its list, especially if it does not know what
it will get if it makes the request. Therefore, it is not enough to say
that if the FDA wants the information, it can get it without the
plaintiff's help. Moreover, since the plaintiff's attorney will have
reviewed the documents, he or she has the best idea of what is
really there and what ought to go to the FDA.
There is, however, something the plaintiff's attorney might
do-notify the FDA that the agency should ask for what the plain-
tiff received. But is that in the interest of the plaintiff?. Or is the
plaintiff better off by having her lawyer say to the defendant,
"Suppose I told the FDA about these documents, or suppose I did
not-could we then settle the case?" How could any settlement be
at a higher price than the price that the plaintiff would get if her
lawyer had threatened to, but not gone to the FDA? But what if
that conversation took place? Would it be blackmail or at least un-
ethical? Nonetheless, is it not likely that the plaintiff will be in a
better position if her lawyer just keeps quiet and does not rock the
boat, rather than bringing in the FDA?
Whatever way the client feels, we have to ask whether her deci-
sion should dictate what information goes to the government
agency designated by law to protect all of us from similar injuries.
Seen in that light, I believe it is inappropriate to leave that deci-
sion to a plaintiff and her lawyer.
[Vol. 24:109
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Defendants and their lawyers are becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated about these issues. Thus, if they do not want to disclose in-
formation to a government agency, they ask the judge to enter a
two-way protective order which forbids everyone, both the plaintiff
and the defendant, from talking to anybody about it. When the
FDA asks for the information, the defendant can refuse, citing the
court order. That sounds fine in theory, but it happens to be
weighted quite heavily one way, rather like the famous aphorism of
Anatole France that "The law in all its majesty forbids the rich
and poor alike from sleeping under the bridges of Paris." So here,
the "equality" really runs entirely in one direction-favoring the
defendant.
3. Legislative Bodies
There are also legislative bodies legitimately interested in the in-
formation. Some committees in Congress are very aggressive, yet
many are not. None of them has a regular reporting system like the
FDA, but they need to be informed, even though they have even
less time to investigate than the FDA. While in theory they have
subpoena power, they do not use it very often. They are supposed
to protect the public, yet it is unlikely that agencies or legislative
bodies are going to get this information, unless the case goes to
trial or unless we change some of the rules on protective orders.
4. Other Potential Plaintiffs
There is another group that has been left out-other plaintiffs,
that is, other victims. This group includes those who have already
filed suit, those who have a claim or who may have written the
company but not filed suit, and those who do not even know they
have a legitimate claim. Can the plaintiff do anything about them?
Surely, the defendant will abhor the idea of this information going
to other lawyers, because it will cause more litigation, and it will
surely cost more money. However, if we do not allow the sharing of
information among plaintiffs' attorneys, we perpetuate a system
which maximizes inefficiency. It requires each lawyer to re-invent
all of the discovery-to figure out the right interrogatories and
document requests to make and to determine whom to depose and
what questions to ask. That leads to delay and unnecessary ex-
penditures, and in the end is not beneficial to the other clients.
1989]
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There are other harms to subsequent plaintiffs beyond the harm
of having a second lawyer redo the discovery in the case. Most trial
lawyers know that the first time a witness is under oath, the testi-
mony is fresher, and things come out which, upon reflection, are
not always said on the second and third deposition. Thus, when
the theory of the defendant's case is not entirely clear, there are
some explanations given early in the testimony that are not en-
tirely consistent. When the defendant's witnesses have an opportu-
nity to look at documents, suddenly their views about what hap-
pened change a little bit. Therefore, while the later discovery may
prove beneficial for other reasons, the first time a witness is de-
posed, there are things which come out that the defendants in
most cases would prefer not to have on the record. All of this ad-
vantage, of course, is lost if the original plaintiff's attorney cannot
pass the results of her discovery on to the other plaintiffs. This
inefficiency is another cost of the present system. This cost is
borne entirely by the plaintiffs because the defendant knows what
happened the first time, but the plaintiffs in the second and third
cases will not.
5. Business Competitors
The final group of people we need to think about is the defend-
ant's business competitors. As between the defendant and its com-
petitors, does it matter to our system whether one rather than the
other makes the sale? It seems to me that it does to some extent. If
we are talking about one product being potentially dangerous and
another one not, or if we are talking about consumer freedom of
choice, both of which are values we ought to protect in our system,
then the question becomes how highly do we value each of them
and at what cost? However that balance may be struck, it is clear
that our present system does not factor these values into the dis-
closure equation at all.
III. DEFENDANTS' RATIONALE FOR LIMITING DISCLOSURE
The answer given by those who defend the present system to
those like me who want much more of the fruits of discovery made
public, is that litigation is for the litigants and not for anyone else.
But that is true only if one accepts the defendant's premise that
court records are only for the litigants, and it overlooks the fact
that the courts are funded by the public and serve a public func-
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tion. As I will assert in a moment, that view is too simplistic. Nev-
ertheless, under the present law, these other interests take a back
seat to the lawsuit. The parties can operate in virtual secrecy be-
cause under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, keeping the case
moving would be good cause for issuing broad protective orders,
rather than engaging in lengthy discovery disputes, and yet that
rationale would allow everything to be kept under seal.3
A. Preventing Bias of Future Juries
In any event, assume that the case is eventually settled or dis-
posed of prior to trial, as are over ninety percent of the civil cases
that are brought in federal district courts and elsewhere. Of course,
if the case goes to trial, then much of the information would come
out. However, some of it might still not be made public either be-
cause it was not relevant, because the plaintiff chose for tactical
reasons not to introduce it as evidence, or because the lawyer did
not appreciate its value.
Suppose that once the case is closed, the press, the FDA and
everyone else decide to try again to gain access to this information.
Is there a difference in how the competing interests are weighed
now, such that the balance should come out differently? To the
extent that the defendant's justification for secrecy was .that pre-
trial disclosure would interfere with the trial in this case, the fact
that there is not going to be any trial makes it hard to understand
what interest in secrecy remains. What the defendant will say in
these situations is: "What about the next case? The jurors in the
next case may be affected. The court should consider whether
there are cases pending in that courthouse or in other jurisdictions
and consider the effect of disclosures on our right to a fair trial in
those cases." There is no clear answer on this issue because it de-
pends on the facts of each case. My own view is to be quite skepti-
cal of such claims, especially since courts deal regularly with much
more serious problems in criminal cases, such as the effort of Lieu-
tenant Colonel Oliver North to get an impartial jury.
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action.").
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B. Conserving Business Secrets and Litigation Resources
A second reason given by defendants when they seek a protec-
tive order early in a case is that the litigation process will be
slowed down without such an order. There will be inordinate de-
lays if documents have to be reviewed individually and if counsel
will have to litigate over which documents must be disclosed to
opposing counsel. Again, that argument is moot after a case is
closed. The defense, of course, responds that these documents con-
tain legitimate trade secrets which the company is entitled to keep
secret. Indeed, the defense claims that the reason it settled the
case is to maintain its secrets. I agree that the defendant has a
legitimate interest in keeping from the public those documents
which are in fact trade secrets, which are explicitly protected
under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But
that is a very narrow category of records compared to the enor-
mous number of documents which the courts have allowed defend-
ants to keep secret in the discovery process.
The defendant may nevertheless insist that "litigation is litiga-
tion is litigation," and that information used in litigation is not
intended for public use. With respect, I suggest that is simply a
conclusion and not a reason. Litigation is not just for the litigants,
at least not in our system. In our system, we are concerned with
overall justice. We are concerned about the next case. We are con-
cerned about public controversies that arise in public forums and
are decided there. After all, that is one of the reasons that we have
the court system.
Next, the defendant will insist that if it knew the court might
make this information public, even at the end of the case, it would
never have turned anything over to the plaintiff, and it surely will
be smart enough not to do so in the next case. Again, that is the
kind of threat that probably cannot be carried out since, if the in-
formation is relevant, the defendant has to turn it over. In theory,
the defendant could threaten to litigate discovery on an item-by-
item basis and suggest that the plaintiff will receive nothing until
the judge orders materials produced, which will slow the case
down, and burden the plaintiff and the judge. But this will also
burden the defendant, who will have to pay lawyers to go through
the documents item-by-item and formulate an objection to each,
increasing the cost to the defendant. Despite these threats, defend-
ants are probably not going to be that obstinate in the future, and
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if they tried, it probably would not work.
Nonetheless, the courts have continued to be reluctant to make
discovery public, even at the conclusion of the case, even when the
defendant is no longer making the product, and even when the in-
formation is years old. There is one important matter not to over-
look. If the defendant can convince the court, even after the case is
over, that any documents contain legitimate trade secrets or other
proprietary information, they will not be disclosed.
IV. THE JUDICIARY'S TREATMENT OF DISCLOSURE ISSUES
A. Common Law Principles
Rather than deal with the substance of the defendants' particu-
lar arguments, the courts have set up some rather artificial bound-
aries or ground rules that define the categories of documents that
can and cannot be disclosed. First, the courts have asked whether
this document was used by the court or was at least filed in court
with a request for a ruling by the judge. These cases, which involve
access to court records under common law principles,4 focus on
whether a document became part of the judicial decision making
process. Courts ask whether the defendant submitted it to the
court as part of its motion for summary judgment or for some
other purpose, or whether the plaintiff used it to defend part of
her claim. They also ask whether it was introduced as a pre-trial
exhibit or listed in the pre-trial order for use at trial.' In those
cases, the courts presume that those documents should be public.
However, this approach does not encompass that many documents.
In addition, it gives the defendant an incentive to settle the case
very early so that the least amount of information will be made
public.
4. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). Following the Su-
preme Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980),
which held that the public has a first amendment right to attend criminal trials, the lower
federal courts have recognized a first amendment right of access to the records actually used
in litigation, including both civil and criminal cases. E.g., In re Continental Ill. Sec. Lit., 732
F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
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B. Access to Filed Documents
In many cases, the public may have an interest in examining
records which are produced in discovery even if they are not actu-
ally presented to a judge. Because these documents have not been
filed for use in the judicial decision making process, courts have
not recognized any common law right of access to them. Nonethe-
less, for many years, there was a right of access under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,' which required that discovery materials
be filed with the clerk and made available to the public unless
there was "good cause" for issuing a protective order under Rule
26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The difficulty is that in 1980, the draftsmen of the federal rules
changed Rule 5(d) to allow district courts to adopt orders specify-
ing that many documents received in discovery need not be filed.
Many courts have exercised that option, and thus many types of
documents that used to be filed are no longer filed in the court-
house. However, as the courts in the Agent Orange litigation ob-
served, Rule 5(d) was amended not for the purpose of maintaining
secrecy, but because the federal courthouses were being over-
whelmed with paper.' Judge Mansfield, chairman of the Civil
Rules Committee which prepared the amendment to Rule 5(d),
wrote a letter at the time assuring Congress that the purpose of the
change was not to have secret documents and that the committee
intended the courts to have the power to require the filing and un-
sealing of documents which became a matter of public interest,
even if the documents were not originally filed and hence were not
public then." In the Agent Orange litigation, the courts did just
that in the course of approving settlement.
In any case, one federal appeals court has held that district
courts have no power to issue Rule 5(d) filing orders after final
judgment, based on the theory that once the case is over, the case
is over, and the court does not have any power to order filing.9 In
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d).
7. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 567-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afl'd
821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dow Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 108 S. Ct. 344
(1987).
8. 104 F.R.D. at 565 n.4, aff'd, 821 F.2d at 146; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) Advisory
Committee note (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments), 77 F.R.D. 613, 622-23
(1978).
9. See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group Inc., 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 838 (1989). In reaching this conclusion, the court failed to analyze the history and
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one case where this happened, however, the "no filing" decision
did not leave the requester in the lurch. The court also chose to
modify the protective order, which continued in effect after the
case was over, to allow the plaintiff's lawyers to give the documents
to anyone. 10 In most cases, the plaintiff's lawyer is more than will-
ing to turn over the documents, particularly at the end of the case.
In most cases, that solution is acceptable, but it is not acceptable
in all cases. Moreover, if the plaintiff is recalcitrant or just plain
ornery, this approach encourages third party intervention, which in
turn may delay the case-in-chief and generate unnecessary ancil-
lary litigation. However, it is still an improvement over no disclo-
sure at all.
V. PRINCIPLED REFORM OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER SYSTEM
Is this a satisfactory solution? Should we say that disclosure of
this kind of information is too important in cases like this and that
the defendant should be required to justify the need for secrecy
with respect to each document because the public interest is at
stake? Or should we accept the notion that litigation is only for
litigants and not for anyone else?
In general, the particular lawsuit ought to be the primary focus
of our litigation rules. Thus, if the parties are willing, for whatever
reasons, to keep most information secret, we ought to be willing to
allow them to do that. I say that not only because I believe that
the parties should be able to control their own lawsuits, but also
because, if we had a rule which said that the judge must rule on
claims of secrecy on a document-by-document basis, who would be
there to police the judge? Would we have an official looking over
evolution of the current Rule 5(d) which the Agent Orange opinions discussed at length.
Nor did it explain why the court had power to order filing and disclosure in that case, but
not in this one, or why it presumably makes more sense to require third parties to make
filing and unsealing motions while the case is still an active one, when there may be counter-
vailing reasons for maintaining the status quo with respect to secrecy issues. Nor did the
court explain how third parties who are interested in the public filing of records may assert
this interest in a timely fashion when cases are quietly settled with no advance notice to any
third party.
10. Id at 782-83, 792. In Public Citizen, as in Agent Orange, the third parties seeking
access to the records indicated their willingness to let the defendant retain under seal any
specific documents which were claimed to be "confidential" proprietary records at the time
they were provided to plaintiffs and which still qualified for such treatment. Unlike Agent
Orange, however, the defendant never made any claim of confidentiality with respect to
particular documents, so the effect of the order modifying the protective order was to make
all discovery records public. 858 F.2d at 780 n.4.
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his or her shoulder, or would we give the press or interested citi-
zens the automatic right to appeal in every case, and to appeal
each time a document was kept secret? Either nothing would
change, or we would have utter chaos in the system. Therefore, as
a general proposition, I do not endorse a significant change in our
current protective order system.
There are certain types of disclosures that ought to be made
during the course of litigation, regardless of the general rule. For
these situations the arguments of those supporting a change in the
protective order system are quite compelling largely because we
cannot rely on the litigants and their lawyers to protect the broad
public interest. The public interest should be protected through
disclosures to other plaintiffs' attorneys and regulatory bodies.
A. Sharing Information with Other Plaintiffs
As to the first group, there are no justifications for the defendant
to refuse to allow one plaintiff's lawyer to turn over documents
produced by the defendant to the lawyer for another plaintiff pro-
vided that the second plaintiff's lawyer is willing to abide by the
same protective order as the first one. The sole reason that defend-
ants do not consent is to take advantage of the situation and to
make life more difficult and more inefficient for the second group
of lawyers.
In response, this year the Virginia legislature passed an informa-
tion-sharing bill. The bill went to the Governor, and after objec-
tions were raised by the defense bar about the effective date, the
Governor sent it back, and a proposed modification was ap-
proved.' In Virginia, therefore, plaintiff's attorneys can share the
information that they receive under protective orders entered after
July 1, 1989.
However, the new law is unclear. It does not state whether the
other plaintiff's lawyer must have filed a lawsuit already. It is not
clear whether the law applies to other lawyers who are either not
members of the Virginia Bar or who have cases outside of Virginia.
It fails to make clear which court will enforce the protective order
against the second lawyer-the one issuing the protective order, or
the one where the second case is pending.
Despite these weaknesses, the new law is a major step in the
11. 1989 Va. Acts 702 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Cum. Supp. 1989)).
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right direction. The Virginia General Assembly, stepped in and de-
cided that certain kinds of disclosures are too important to be left
to the lawyers and the adversary process. The legislature decided
that, as long as the second lawyer is bound, the defendant gets all
the protection to which it is entitled. The law also saves valuable
judicial resources.
B. Sharing Information with Regulatory and Legislative Bodies
The second group which deserves freer access to information in-
cludes regulatory bodies, such as the FDA, as well as the legisla-
tures, both federal and state, which have jurisdiction over the sub-
ject of the lawsuit. These groups should be able to get the
information while the lawsuit is pending, without waiting until the
case is concluded or goes to trial. These are the people who are
supposed to protect the public, and we should not deny them this
potentially vital information. One of the difficulties is that in situa-
tions such as the prior hypothetical, there is no routine way in
which a legislature or regulatory agency can be forbidden from dis-
seminating the information to the public, as a lawyer can. Indeed,
regulatory agencies may be required by law to make public any
information concerning a public health hazard. I believe that, even
with governmental bodies, a defendant ought to be entitled to a
little protection. For instance, a defendant should be notified that
a plaintiff's lawyer is going to tell or has told the FDA about a
particular problem. It would not be unreasonable for a court rule
or statute to require that type of notice, even if there was not
much that the defendant could do if it knew the plan to give the
alleged trade secrets to the agency. But at least it could try to per-
suade the agency or lawmakers not to make this information pub-
lic. It could also bring a lawsuit to try to prevent disclosure, al-
though it might succeed against an agency only in a very narrow
category of cases. 2 Therefore, while a defendant has a legitimate
interest in seeing that its truly confidential information is not
made public, the public interest in seeing that our regulatory bod-
ies work in an effective manner is far more important.
Unfortunately, under our adversary system, we cannot count on
the plaintiffs' attorneys to see that the government and other
plaintiffs' attorneys will get this information. There is real conflict
between the duty of plaintiffs' lawyers to their clients and the duty
12. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
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which many lawyers would feel to assure that an unsafe product
does not continue on the market. That kind of conflict must be
resolved in favor of the client unless there is a supervening rule of
law that not only allows, but encourages, lawyers to do what most
of us believe is their public duty.
VI. CONCLUSION
If these proposals are adopted, what will this do to litigation?
Will plaintiffs receive less information than in the past? Perhaps,
although I rather doubt it. Will they be able to settle sooner be-
cause the defendants would rather not give them any information
at all? Yes, and they may get somewhat larger settlements. I say
that based on our experience with recent cases involving the Shiley
heart valve, in which the company has been paying everybody
enormous sums of money before discovery starts. The company
paid very large settlements, avoiding the discovery which might
have revealed to the public and the FDA when the company first
knew the device was unsafe.
Finally, I do not believe that defendants will refuse to produce
incriminating documents in the fear that they may become availa-
ble to other lawyers or the government. I have learned that, all too
often, defendants assert that their business will collapse if any doc-
uments are made public. Those claims are often vastly overstated,
rather like those of the Department of Defense in the Pentagon
Papers case, where claims of grave harms to national defense were
rejected, at no apparent cost to the republic. 13 These documents
often contain insignificant information, and little that can legiti-
mately be kept secret. The defendants simply do not want to make
them public, and they want to make life as difficult as possible for
plaintiffs, press groups, and others who are trying to get hold of
them. While I am not a big supporter of the use of sanctions under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 the courts should start con-
sidering whether Rule 11 might not be appropriately applied to de-
13. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd per curiam,
444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The government claimed that publication
of the documents - certain volumes of a pentagon study relating to Vietnam and a Defense
Department study relating to the Tonkin Gulf incident - would "involve a serious breach
of the security of the United States" and would "cause irreparable injury to the national
defense." Id. at 326. The district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction against the
publication because the government was unable to establish that there would be irreparable
injury or a breach of national security. Id. at 330.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
[Vol. 24:109
1989] PROTECTIVE ORDERS 125
fendants who unnecessarily multiply litigation by asking for se-
crecy when secrecy is not warranted. There need to be, I suggest,
different incentives for defendants so that they do not claim se-
crecy at every opportunity.
In conclusion, I suppose that the system is not inefficient at pre-
sent, because much of the vital information eventually is made
public. But it could work a lot better, if we did not put all of the
responsibility for its operation on the litigants and the trial judges.
Therefore, we should ask our courts and our legislatures to impose
rules which control the discretion of litigants and protect the legit-
imate interest of defendants, but which also recognize that the
public interest lies elsewhere than in secrecy when public safety is
at stake.

